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The Perils of the ‘Europeanisation’ of Extradition Procedures in the EU 
 Mutuality, Fundamental Rights and Constitutional Guarantees  
Dr Theodore Konstadinides1 
 
Abstract 
This article focuses at the main problems regarding the current application of EU 
extradition procedures in relation to the area of judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters. It introduces the ‘Europeanisation’ of extradition procedures through a 
discussion based on the continuity of the principle of mutual recognition from the EC 
Treaties to the EU Constitutional Treaty. The latest manifestation of this continuity is 
the introduction of the European Arrest Warrant (adopted on June 13, 20002) that is 
aimed to simplify the extradition procedures for suspected criminals within the 
territory of the European Union by creating a positive list of criminal areas. The 
author discusses the innovations introduced by the Framework Decision on the 
European Arrest Warrant (abolition of the test of dual criminality) and then focuses 
on two main problem areas based on the reaction of certain Member States: i) 
Compatibility with Constitutional Guarantees: where the author notices a change of 
attitude in the national courts from being eager to contest the constitutionality of EU 
Arrest Warrant implementation law to being more pragmatic about authorising the 
extradition of their own nationals ii) Compatibility with Human Rights: where the 
author argues that the principle of mutual recognition is not adequate for 
adjudicating interstate criminal cases when it operates in isolation. He therefore 
proposes the enforcement of mutual trust or ‘full faith and credit’ accompanied by the 
standards of procedural rights set out in the ECHR and the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights. 
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The Europeanisation of Extradition: The Continuity of Mutual Recognition  
Extradition procedures between Member States had for long been based on 
intergovernmental arrangements controlled by the European Convention on 
Extradition (1957); its Protocols2 and the Council of Europe European Convention on 
Terrorism (1977). The 1957 Convention was ultimately complimented by the 
‘Convention on Simplified Extradition Procedure between the Member States of the 
EU’ (1996) and the ‘Convention on Extradition between Member States of the EU’ 
(1996). The former Convention not only provided the agreement of the requested state 
to the surrender but also emphasised the right of consent of the arrested person. The 
latter Convention contemplated the standard extradition procedure in compliance with 
Article 6 TEU, but precluded the arrested individual from consenting to the surrender. 
In terms of the Community Pillar, the Schengen Implementing Convention - itself an 
intergovernmental arrangement - was integrated into EC law by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. The Schengen Convention includes, inter alia, extradition provisions 
shared between the participant states through lodging a request in the Schengen 
Information System. 
The trend among Member States to establish a simplified and efficient 
procedure, founded on their mutual confidence and respect to the integrity of each 
others constitutions and judicial systems, was manifested in Articles 31(a)(b) and 
34(2)(b) TEU. These Treaty provisions set out the first series of targets providing for 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters, the facilitation of extradition and the 
adoption of framework decisions for the purpose of approximating the laws and 
regulations of Member States. The Tampere European Council (1999) endorsed the 
principle of mutual recognition, which according to its conclusions should become 
‘the cornerstone’ of judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters3. Most 
significantly, The Heads of State or Government requested from the Council and the 
Commission to adopt by December 2000 implementation measures with reference to 
the principle of mutual recognition in criminal matters4. Thus, in line with Tampere, 
the European Union attempted to extend the principle of mutual recognition to 
                                                 
2
 Protocol 1 of European Convention on Extradition (1975) and Protocol 2 of European Convention on 
Extradition (1978) 
3
 the Presidency Conclusions at the Tampere European Council, October 15 and 16, 1999, Para 33-37 
Available online at http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/oct99/oct99_en.htm (browsed 27.02.07) 
4
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judicial decisions between Member States in such a manner that a measure arising 
from a judgment of a Member State should be automatically accepted and produce the 
same effects in all Member States of the Union5. As a result, Member States were 
gradually encouraged to show mutual trust in their criminal justice systems to such an 
extent that each Member State would acknowledge and trust the criminal law in force 
in all the other Member States, even in cases when the outcome would be different 
from that applied in its domestic legislation. 
The principle of mutual recognition was first applied as collateral to 
Community harmonisation during the building of the internal market. Like 
Community harmonisation, it gradually became an additional factor of limitation to 
national competence. Its operation between Member States on product requirements 
case law6 works on the basic premise that a State has to accept the marketing in its 
own territory of products lawfully produced and marketed in other Member States. 
This results in a double regulatory burden. By extension, EC Institutions introduced 
the principle of mutual recognition in terms of the direct execution of final criminal 
decisions in the whole territory of the European Union. Hence, the principle of mutual 
recognition appeared perfectly fit to ensure that an individual tried in a Member State 
for a particular offence should not be judged for a second time for the identical 
offence, either in the same state in which he offended or any other Member State of 
the Union (ne bis in idem principle7). This principle also applies in the Schengen 
Convention. Article 54 states that Schengen rules will prevent a second conviction 
after a person had been extradited to the issuing state. This was recently verified by 
the ECJ in Gasparini and Others8. In the context of the European Arrest Warrant, the 
Court clarified its position in relation to the ne bis in idem principle in Gözütok and 
Brügge9. This position has been integrated by the Framework decision:  
“It is clear from this opinion that the principle of ne bis in idem, when 
applied within a context of mutual recognition in criminal proceedings 
                                                 
5
 Ibid. See particularly Title VI. Mutual recognition of judicial decisions  
 
6
 Case 120/78 Commission Rewe-Zentrale AG v Bundesverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) 
[1979] ECR 649 For further discussion see Maduro, M.P. “We the Court: The European Court of 
Justice & The European Economic Constitution”, Hart (1997), See pp 33; 131-136 
7
 Translated from Latin as “not twice for the same”. 
8
 Case C-467/04 , (September 28, 2006) 
9
 Cases C-187/01 and C-385/01 Gözütok and Brügge [2003] ECR I-1345; Conway, G., “Judicial 
Interpretation and the Third Pillar: Ireland’s Acceptance of the European Arrest Warrant and Gözütok 
and Brügge Case” (2005) 13 (2) European Journal of Crime 255-283 
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in the EU should be given a broad interpretation allowing for the 
differences in what is perceived to be a ‘final judgement’ in the various 
Member States. This European notion of ne bis in idem should be 
reflected in the text of the UK bill which will implement the European 
Arrest Warrant.”10 
A similar standpoint has been taken time and again by the Council and the 
Commission11. There, enhanced mutual recognition of judicial decisions and 
judgments followed by the necessary approximation of national legislation would 
facilitate co-operation between authorities and the judicial protection of individual 
rights. As a result, in the context of Third-Pillar criminal law, EC Institutions have set 
out to achieve a dual objective: First, to overcome problems arising from diversity (of 
national legal systems) through a joint respect for each others’ domestic judicial 
decisions. Second, to invest on the power of harmonisation (of national legislation) as 
part of an evolutionary process to bring to an end all national transitional procedures 
for the recognition of judgments and the guarantee of cross-border rights. This was 
implied to a certain extent by the Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European 
Union (2001)12 where there was a suggestion that “all transnational issues which they 
(EU citizens) instinctively sense can only be tackled by working together...” 
However, the Laeken declaration merely posed the question of whether “…we want 
to adopt a more integrated approach to police and criminal law cooperation” instead 
of providing concrete guidelines as to how should the Community structure its 
objectives and priorities.  
The Laeken guidelines were complimented by the Convention’s Working 
Group X on “Freedom, Security and Justice”13. The Group reached a consensus over a 
number of points including Judicial Cooperation in criminal matters. There the Group 
reiterated the dual basis of judicial cooperation in criminal matters which includes: i) 
                                                 
10
 Justice Response to Draft Extradition Bill (2002), September 2002, Para 25. Available at 
http://www.justice.org.uk/images/pdfs/extraditionbill.pdf (last browsed 27.02.07) 
11
 “Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Mutual 
recognition of Final Decisions in criminal matters” [COM/2000/0495]; “Green Paper on the 
approximation, mutual recognition and enforcement of criminal sanctions in the European Union” 
[COM/2004/334]; “White Paper on exchanges of information on convictions and the effect of such 
convictions in the European Union” [COM/2005/10]; “Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the EP on the mutual recognition of judicial decisions in criminal matters and the 
strengthening of mutual trust between Member States” [COM/2005/195]  
12
 Available at http://europa.eu/constitution/futurum/documents/offtext/doc151201_en.htm 
13
 [CONV 449/02]; [CONV 614/03] 
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facilitation of mutual recognition of judicial decisions and ii) approximation of 
legislation on procedural and substantive criminal law (establishing minimum rules as 
to the definition of cross-border criminal offences and sanctions). The list of offences, 
later covered by the European Arrest Warrant, drew on Articles 29 and 31 TEU and 
the Tampere European Council Conclusions14.  
 However, the proposal did not preclude the Council from identifying and 
introducing - through unanimity and prior assent by the Parliament - other types of 
crime. One should note that the EU Constitutional Treaty15 will merge the European 
Community with the other two pillars of the European Union, therefore extending the 
competence of the Court in Police and Judicial Cooperation in criminal matters. But 
still, the principle of national borders remains intact in the EU Constitutional Treaty 
and according to Guild “criminal law is bound by the idea of borders”16. By 
extension, EU citizens are bound by the diversity of national criminal systems that 
operate within these borders.  
The EU Constitutional Treaty, which has currently been surrounded by a 
paralysis, is aimed to offer EU Citizens an area of Freedom Security and Justice 
(Article III-257 – III-277). This constitutes an area of shared competence between the 
Union and the Member States. Article III-270 provides that: 
“Judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the Union shall be based on 
the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions 
and shall include the approximation of the laws and regulations of the 
Member States…”  
Article III-270 (2) provides that European framework laws shall establish 
‘minimum rules’ that ‘shall take into account the differences between the legal 
traditions and systems of the Member States.’17 This, of course, ‘shall not prevent 
                                                 
14
 Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusions, (15-16.10.1999) Available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm (last browsed 27.02.07) The list of offences 
includes: terrorism; human trafficking; arms trafficking; money laundering; corruption; counterfeiting; 
computer crime; organised crime. 
15
 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJC 310, (December 16 2004) 
16
 Guild, E., “The EU’s Constitutional Future and the European Arrest Warrant”, ‘Eurowarrant: 
European Extradition in the 21st Century’, Justice Conference held in London, (July 5 - 6, 2003). 
Available at http://www.justice.org.uk/ourwork/eu/index.html  (browsed on September 26, 2006) 
17
 (a) mutual admissibility of eveidence; (b) the rights of individuals in criminal procedure; (c) the 
rights of victims of crime; (d) any other specific aspects of criminal procedure which the Council has 
identified in advance by a European decision; for the adoption of such a decision, the Council shall act 
unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. 
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Member States from maintaining or introducing a higher level of protection for 
individuals.’ Thus, once the EU Constitutional Treaty is ratified and the current 
‘pillarised’ structure is abandoned, the appropriate measures for regulating the old 
third-pillar issues would be ‘European laws’ or ‘framework laws’. Such legislative 
instruments - adopted by the Council acting unanimously and only after obtaining the 
consent of the European Parliament - would lay down the rules and procedures for 
ensuring that the principle of mutual recognition would operate throughout the Union 
of all forms of judicial decisions. The minimum rules set out by ‘European laws’ and 
‘framework laws’ could possibly relate to citizens’ rights in criminal procedure; 
issues of admissibility of evidence and the rights of victims of crimes. However the 
unanimity requirement for their adoption, limits their potential to gradually construct 
a ‘European code of criminal procedure’ in an enlarged Union of 27 Member States 
by January 2007. 
The European Arrest Warrant: Mutual Recognition vs Double Criminality Test 
i) The European Arrest Warrant: Context, Adjudication and Competence 
A thriving manifestation of the principle of mutual recognition in the context 
of European criminal law was the introduction of the European Arrest Warrant18 in 
2004. The Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender 
Procedures between Member States19 replaced all multilateral extradition agreements 
and EU or Schengen extradition arrangements at the end of 2002. Already from 
Article 1 (2) the Framework Decision points to the principle of mutual recognition as 
the preliminary way of executing any European arrest warrant. To put it in the 
Commission’s phraseology, “the arrest warrant is the first and most symbolic measure 
applying the principle of mutual recognition”20. Given the broadness of areas that it 
captures and the time that was introduced, it has been characterised by academics as 
                                                 
18
 Council Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures 
Between Member States (13 June 2002) (2002/584/JHA).  See also Blextoon, R. (ed.), “Handbook on 
the European Arrest Warrant”, Cambridge University Press (2004) 
19
 2002/584/JHA (called the Framework Decision hereafter) 
20
 Report from the Commission based on Article 34 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 
2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures between Member States”, COM 
(2005) 63 
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the “star rule on judicial cooperation in criminal matters”21 and as “an important 
procedural instrument in the fight against terrorism.”22  
Contextually, the European Arrest Warrant covers almost every offence 
punishable in the Member States by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a 
maximum period of at least three years23. Moreover, it is aimed to simplify the 
extradition procedures for suspected criminals within the territory of the European 
Union by creating a positive list of criminal areas. When, therefore, a suspected crime 
is included on a designated ‘criminal area’ (e.g. illegal human trafficking24, money 
laundering25, drug importation26 or terrorism27), the arrested person can be extradited. 
Member States cannot refuse to surrender to another Member State any of their own 
citizens on the grounds that they are nationals28. This implies that if a Member State 
issues an arrest warrant against another Member State, then the latter must surrender 
its national to the former without verification of the ‘double criminality principle’.  
The European Arrest Warrant involves a subordination of the adjudication of 
all extraditions between Member States to the jurisdiction of the EU, which will also 
be responsible for the interpretation of the Framework Decision in any case where a 
dispute arises. Disputes arising from the Framework Decision may be referred to the 
Council and then on to the Court in accordance with Article 35 TEU. However, under 
this provision not all national courts of last resort are capable of using the preliminary 
reference procedure under Article 234 EC as it is reserved to the courts of those 
Member States that have made a declaration according to Article 35(2) TEU. 
Furthermore, Article 35(6) and (7) TEU provide that the Court of Justice shall have 
jurisdiction to review the legality of framework decisions and decisions in actions 
brought by a Member State or the Commission jurisdiction to rule on any dispute 
                                                 
21
 Jimeno - Bulnes, M., “European Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters”, (2003) European Law 
Journal 9 (5) 
22
 Jimeno-Bulnes, M., “After September 11th: The Fight Against Terrorism in National and European 
Law. Substantive and Procedural Rules: Some Examples” (2004) 10 (2) European Law Journal 235-
253. Although one should take note that the Commission had almost finished work on the proposal 
when the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 took place.  
23
 See Article 2 (2) of the Framework Decision for a list of offences. 
24
 King’s Prosecutor (Brussels) v Armas [2006] 1 All E.R. 647 
25
 Hunt v Belgium [2006] EWHC 165 
26
 Hall v Germany [2006] EWHC 462; Parasiliti – Mollica v Deputy Public Prosecutor (Messina) 
[2005] EWHC 3262 
27
 Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Constitutional Court), decision of 18 July 2005 (2 BvR 2236/04) 
on the German European Arrest Warrant Law. 
28
 See Articles 3; 4; 5; 6; 8; 9; 10; 11; 12; 17; 26; 27 of the Framework Decision as regards details on 
operation and procedures of the European Arrest Warrant. 
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between Member States regarding the interpretation or application of acts adopted 
under Article 34(2) TEU. Yet, one need to take into account that after assessing and 
interpreting a Member State’s enabling legislation on the European Arrest Warrant, 
the Court may arrive to an interpretation that is contradictory to that of the national 
courts. Finally, Article 35 (5) TEU states that the Court has no jurisdiction in criminal 
matters, to review national action linked with the maintenance of law and order as 
well as internal security. This has been replicated in the EU Constitutional Treaty 
under Article III-377:   
“….the Court of Justice of the European Union shall have no 
jurisdiction to review the validity or proportionality of operations 
carried out by the police or other law-enforcement services of a 
Member State or the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon 
Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the 
safeguarding of internal security.” 
Thus, the competence of the Court to adjudicate on the area of freedom, 
security, and justice is limited. This contradicts any view that the Union’s competence 
will embrace the third EU pillar once the EU Constitutional Treaty is ratified. Gregory 
notes: 
 “…whilst the EU has the competence to be involved in 9/11 response 
management areas such as civil protection and security, its involvement 
is necessarily limited. The involvement is limited first by the principles 
of ‘subsidiarity’ and ‘proportionality’, which restricts the EU in terms 
of new measures, to those which are best achieved, in whole or in part, 
by a collective response.”29  
Second, Article III-270 (2)30 of the EU Constitutional Treaty clarifies that the 
Union may only adopt minimum rules that may not prevent Member States from 
                                                 
29
 Gregory, F., “The EU’s Response to 9/11: A Case Study of Institutional Roles and Policy Processes 
with Special Reference to Issues of Accountability and Human Rights” (2005) 17 Terrorism and 
Political Violence 105-123 To the extent necessary to facilitate mutual recognition of judgments and 
judicial decisions and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters having a cross-border 
dimension, European framework laws may establish minimum rules. Such rules shall take into account 
the differences between the legal traditions and systems of the Member States. 
30
 To the extent necessary to facilitate mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions 
and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters having a cross-border dimension, European 
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maintaining or introducing a higher level of protection. This, according to Article III-
270(2)(b) also concerns the rights of individuals engaged into criminal proceedings. 
Yet, as previously discussed, the possibility of creating a ‘model criminal code’ with 
no binding legal force is a thorny process given the requirement of unanimity to adopt 
European laws or framework laws for regulating the previous third-pillar issues. 
 
ii) The Abolition of the Double Criminality Test 
 
Most significantly, the Framework Decision abolishes the ‘double criminality 
rule’ of the thirty-two offences listed in Article 2 (2) as well as abolishing - where the 
arrested person consents the ‘speciality rule’31. The ‘double criminality rule’ has only 
been reserved for offences other than those designated in Article 2 of the Council 
Framework Decision. What is more, the new system introduced by the European 
Arrest Warrant does not apply if the requesting Member State has not yet ratified the 
Council Framework Decision and incorporated it into its national law, either through 
specific legislation (i.e. European Arrest Warrant Act) or a constitutional amendment 
(Portugal, Slovenia). Currently, the European Arrest Warrant has been implemented 
by all Member States (Italy’s implementation was not completed until April 200532). 
Before the introduction of the Framework Decision, the jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Justice33 in relation to extradition procedures went so far as the extradition 
rules found in the Schengen Convention.  
As already mentioned, the European Arrest Warrant applies without the need 
to fulfill the condition of the double criminalisation of an act. Nevertheless, in some 
cases the old test of double criminality may coincide with the operation of the 
European Arrest Warrant. For instance, under section 64(3) (b) of the UK’s 
Extradition Act 200334 a person’s conduct…  
                                                                                                                                            
framework laws may establish minimum rules. Such rules shall take into account the differences 
between the legal traditions and systems of the Member States. 
31
 Article 13 (1) 
32
 Report from the Commission based on Article 34 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 
2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures between Member States (revised 
version) COM (2006) 8 final. The first Report from the Commission was issued in February 2005, 
COM (2005) 63 
33
 Referred as ‘the Court’ hereafter 
34
 The Extradition Act (2003) entered into force on January, 1st, 2004 
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“…also constitutes an extradition offence in relation to the category 1 
territory (i.e. all EU countries operating the European Arrest Warrant 
System) if…the conduct would constitute an offence under the law of 
the relevant part of the United Kingdom if it occurred in that part of the 
United Kingdom.”  
In Hosseini v France35 an agreement was reached between the Member States 
concerned that the conduct of illegal human trafficking constituted an offence in 
France and would have constituted an offence had it occurred in England. Therefore 
the conduct alleged in the warrant amounted to an ‘extradition offence’ pursuant to s. 
64(3) of the Extradition Act 2003. The British High Court took into account the 
European Arrest Warrant concluding:  
“…the relevant question, therefore, is whether his (Hosseini’s) 
extradition pursuant to the 2003 Act would be in accordance with the 
law; and, as I have already indicated, it plainly would be. The starting 
point under the 2003 Act is the issue of a European arrest warrant by a 
judicial authority in another member state. Consistently with the 
Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 which it implements, the 
2003 Act recognises and gives effect to the issue of the warrant.” 
The ‘double criminality rule’ has for long been considered by many Member 
States as the core feature of extradition law. Its abolition has created practical 
problems that render the application of the European Arrest Warrant open to 
discussion. One example is when the warrant does not provide particulars of the 
provision of national law that renders the conduct of the arrested person an offence 
under national law36. In Hunt v Belgium37 for instance the Administrative Court of 
England and Wales ruled that the warrant should contain a statement that “the person, 
in respect of whom the warrant was issued, was accused in the category 1 territory of 
the commission of an offence specified in the warrant”. In Armas38, on the other hand, 
the warrant was clear as the nature and classification of the offence in question was 
                                                 
35
 CO/3261/2006 Hosseini v France [2006] EWHC 1333 
36
 Hall v Germany [2006] EWHC 462 
37
 [2006] WL 316106 
38
 [2006] 1 All E.R. 647 The question in this case was whether a request by Belgium for the extradition 
of a fugitive offender could be successfully brought under section 65 of the British Extradition Act 
(2003) when part of the appellant’s conduct specified in the European Arrest Warrant took place in the 
UK. 
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identified as ‘systematic illegal immigration’ (framework list offence). Nonetheless, 
the warrant had to be quashed as some of the offences of the sentenced (in absentia) 
person had occurred in the UK. Thus the offender could not be surrendered to 
Belgium under section 65(2)(a) of the British Extradition Act 2003, which states that 
“the conduct constitutes an extradition offence in relation to the category 1 territory 
if….  the conduct occurs in the category 1 territory and no part of it occurs in the 
United Kingdom.”  
Compatibility with Human Rights 
Despite the notable progress at EU level in relation to judicial cooperation, 
exchange of information and monitoring39, intergovernmental legislative mechanisms 
are still, to a certain extent, remote from the supranational, even on basic issues such 
as access to justice. Fair Trials Abroad40, has reported certain individual cases during 
2005 that actually depict the diverse practices of the application of justice across the 
European Union41. In the context of the European Arrest Warrant, there is no common 
agenda of legal rights to be activated once the procedure under the Framework 
Decision has been triggered. It appears that mutual judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters cannot operate alone without efficient cross-border criminal cooperation 
measures. For instance, as regards legal aid, there is no mechanism under which 
defence lawyers in either country can coordinate or jointly evaluate the evidence 
available throughout judicial proceedings. What is more, the right to legal 
representation varies among Member States. Individuals will reach a point where they 
will need to cover the costs of legal advice and translation and deal with delays during 
their transfer from the responding to the requesting state42.  
According to the principle of mutual recognition, Member States shall meet 
the standards of human rights protection set out in the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR)43. This also constitutes a Treaty obligation under Article 6 
TEU. However, the little experience of national authorities, deriving from the 
                                                 
39
 Council Decision 2005/876/JHA on the Exchange of Information Extracted from the Criminal 
Record OJ L 322 
40
 Fair Trials Abroad is an organisation working to ensure that citizens accused of a crime in a state 
other than their native receive a fair trial. 
41See Jakobi, S., “Criminal Justice in the EU 2005: The Year of Lost Opportunities”;   Available at 
http://www.fairtrialsabroad.org/ (browsed on September 26, 2006) 
42
 Kakis v Government of the Republic of Cyprus [1978] 1 WLR 772 HL 
43
 Available at http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html (browsed on September 26, 2006) 
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application of the European Arrest Warrant, demonstrates that this is rather an 
uncertain assumption. A reference of ‘respect to fundamental rights’ is made in the 
Preamble (Paragraphs 12; 13) and Article 1(3) of the Framework Decision44. 
However, the ‘in absentia’ rules of Articles 35 of the Framework Decision do not 
allow a person to request a new trial on grounds that s/he was inadequately 
represented at the initial trial. This contradicts the Court’s decision in Krombach v 
Bamberski45, where the ECHR was used as a guiding light in order to establish that 
the Court expressly recognizes the general principle that everyone is entitled to fair 
legal process46. In this case the Court upheld the decision of a German court refusing 
on public policy grounds recognition and enforcement of a French judgment due to 
the fact that the German defendant was denied a hearing by a counsel on a civil claim 
for damages. Moreover, the Framework Decision omits to oblige Member States to 
refuse surrender on grounds of violations of the dual source of the European Union’s 
human rights streaming from the ECHR and the constitutional traditions of the 
Member States47. This commitment has been strengthened by the adoption of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (2000). 
Alegre and Leaf48 comment that the assumption that Member States meet the 
ECHR standards “is open to discussion as, while it is true that all Member States and 
candidate countries have signed up to the ECHR, all have had and continue to have 
judgments against them in the Court of Human Rights.” Potentially, this would have a 
negative impact upon imminent individual claims that an issuing state is violating 
fundamental rights, such as review to detention (Article 5 ECHR) and the right to fair 
trial (Article 6 ECHR; Art. 47 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights49). In 
                                                 
44
 Preamble (12) This Framework Decision respects fundamental rights and observes the principles 
recognised by Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union and reflected in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union(7), in particular Chapter VI thereof. 
Preamble (13) No person should be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious 
risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. 
Article 1 (3) This Framework Decision shall not have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect 
fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on 
European Union. 
45
 Case C-7/98 Krombach v Bamberski [2001] All ER (EC) 584 
46
 Case C-185/95 Baustahlgewebe v Commission [1998] ECR I-8417 (at Para 20, 21); C174/98 & C-
189/98 Netherlands and Van der Wal v Commission [2000] ECR I-0000 (at Para 17)  
47
 Article 6(2 TEU 
48
 Alegre, S., and Leaf, M., “Judicial Cooperation: A Step too Far Too Soon? Case Study – The 
European Arrest Warrant”  (2004) 10 (2) European Law Journal 200 – 217 at 201  
49
 C364/8 (2000) 
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the interest of clarity and human rights protection, a clear system of appeal or judicial 
review should be formulated to be triggered once a serious breach occurs in the 
issuing Member State following surrender. Yet, looking at the way the EU Arrest 
Warrant operates being founded on mutual recognition, Alegre50 adds that you also 
need a certain degree of ‘mutual trust’ and cases such as Ramda “have shown that 
mutual trust is not necessarily built solely on the fact that all Member States are 
signatories to the ECHR.”51 Thus, although we are talking about mutual trust between 
Member States, the margin of appreciation in the application of rights safeguarded by 
the ECHR related to the domestic administration of justice is difficult to sustain. 
Particularly, the admissibility of evidence extracted through torture or ill-treatment 
and the allegations of torture or ill treatment by law enforcement officers constitute 
major barriers to what Alegre calls ‘mutual trust’ between Member States and infringe 
Art 6 ECHR. 
In Ramda52, ill treatment and bodily harm was inflicted on the suspected 
offender by the French Police authorities as a result of an intense interrogation 
procedure. The French authorities denied an investigation of the complaints of ill 
treatment contrary to the request of the British Court. Thus the Secretary of State 
refused to surrender the suspected offender because “it is unlawful for a public 
authority, such as the Secretary of State, to act in a way which is incompatible with a 
Convention (ECHR) right, and of course Article 6(1) ECHR provides for the right to a 
fair trial. The test appears to be whether the evidence establishes a real risk of a 
flagrant denial of justice.”53 Similarly, in the French case of Irastorza Dorronsoro54 
the admissibility of evidence allegedly extracted from an ETA suspect through torture 
or other ill-treatment was considered contrary to a state’s obligations under the UN 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (1984)55. The outcome of both cases emphasizes the need to address the 
issue of lack of mutual trust in national procedural guarantees within the EU. It is 
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worth mentioning that as the Framework Decision is binding as to the end result 
leaving a choice of form and method to Member States, the UK has inserted a human 
rights clause in its Extradition Act (2003). Thereby, the executing judge has the 
authority to deny the extradition of a person on grounds of incompatibility with the 
Human Rights Act 199856.  
The balance between the objectives of security and freedom is very delicate in 
the area of judicial cooperation in criminal matters. This writer suggests that the 
European Court of Justice should be given an active role in policing respect for 
human rights throughout the EU, alongside a wider competence to adjudicate on 
issues involving violations by Member States. This necessitates a relaxing of the 
current ‘standing rules’ under Article 230(4) EC of ‘direct and individual concern’ 
reflected in Plaumann and UPA57 so that individuals may have a direct access to the 
Court in relation to fundamental rights. Unfortunately, Article III-365(4) of the EU 
Constitutional Treaty goes only so far as reflecting the current standing rules of 
Article 230(4) EC enabling the individual applicant to challenge a legislative act 
conditional on satisfaction of the dual requirement of ‘direct and individual concern”. 
Even though Article III-365(4) leaves unmodified the current standing rules in 
relation to legislative acts, it allows more room for individuals to challenge a 
regulatory act that “is of direct and individual concern to him or her, and…a 
regulatory act which is of direct concern to him or her and does not entail 
implementing measures”.  
Still, the requirement of individual concern that has been interpreted 
restrictively by the Court is here despite Advocate General Jacobs view that a person 
should be allowed to bring his case to the Court “by reason of the particular 
circumstances, the measures has, or is liable to have, a substantial adverse effect on 
his interests”58. Arnull argues that the current rules on locus standi create a potential 
conflict with Article II-107 of the EU Constitutional Treaty as it diminishes the 
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individual’s right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial59. The same argument was 
used by the Court of First Instance in Jégo-Quéré 60 that was subsequently overruled 
by the Court of Justice in UPA. There, the Court of Justice emphasized that the Treaty 
has established a complete system of remedies and procedures designed to ensure 
judicial review before the Community courts (Articles 230, 234, 241 EC). In line with 
the Court, Papier argues that Article III-365 (4) only causes delays to access to justice 
and does not create a general barrier to legal protection61. But even delays (which 
constitute a factor in the general complexity to challenge an EC legislative act) are 
likely to lead, according to Arnull, to pressure and finally to a watering down of the 
individual concern test. This would be desirable especially in claims of fundamental 
rights violations.  
The matter of access by individuals to the European Court of Justice62 was one 
of the points raised by The Convention’s Working Group II working on human rights. 
The Convention’s Working Group II examined both the incorporation of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights into the EC Treaty and the possibility of accession of 
the EU to the ECHR. The ratification of the ECHR by the European Union would 
embody a transition of the Community legal system to a distinct organisation with its 
own legal principles, judicial structure and case law. It would “entail (as the Court 
said) a substantial change in the present Community system for the protection of 
human rights in that it would entail the entry of the Community into a distinct 
international institutional system as well as integration of all the provisions of the 
Convention into the Community legal order”63 The Community would thus be subject 
to the external judicial control of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The 
accession to the ECHR that inter alia demanded a uniform interpretation of 
Community case law with that of the ECtHR is entirely different to the current human 
rights protection guaranteed by the Treaty by way of general principles of law drawn 
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predominantly from the ECHR and the national constitutional traditions. It is 
therefore obvious that accession to the ECHR would entail an amendment of the 
Treaty structure being a constitutional change beyond the scope of Article 308 EC. If 
not, the Community would not have the competence to ratify such an international 
agreement.  
Additionally, the metamorphosis of the Charter from a political declaration to 
a binding legal document would be an innovation within the EU legal structures. The 
violation of any right contained in the Charter either by the EC Institutions or by the 
Member States would render the relative measures related to Community law invalid 
and unable to coexist with the rights established by it. In terms of justiciability, the 
Court would be able to act as a Federal Constitutional Court since the Charter would 
“give the European Judges a clear and systematic statement of rights which have 
been endorsed at the highest political level.”64 The Commission would be able under 
Article 226 EC to bring a Member State to the Court for an infringement of a 
fundamental right safeguarded by the Charter. Similarly a Member State would be in 
a position to bring another Member State before the Court for the very same reason 
under Article 227 EC. Finally a Member State would be able to institute proceedings 
against an EC Institution for infringement of a Charter provision under an application 
for annulment under Article 230 EC. Another mean of monitoring the Charter 
enforcement would still be the preliminary reference procedure under Article 234 EC 
concerning the interpretation of a human right provision included in the Charter.  
Compatibility with Constitutional Guarantees: One’s Own Nationals 
 The most controversial measure under the system introduced by the European 
Arrest Warrant is that created by the obligation of a Member State to extradite its own 
nationals at the request of another Member State, even for offences that are not 
punishable in the former65. The non-surrender of own nationals “has its origins in the 
sovereign authority of the ruler to control his subjects, the bond of allegiance between 
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them, and the lack of trust in other legal systems66” Moreover, it constitutes an 
exceptionally delicate issue in extradition law67, employed sometimes by governments 
as a political technique to revive patriotism68. Against this, Articles 3 and 4 of the 
European Arrest Warrant do not recognise the long-standing absolute sovereign right 
to refuse extradition of a Member State’s own subjects.  
In Article 6 of the 1957 European Convention on Extradition identified with 
the concerns of the Member States and allowed room for national authorities to refuse 
extradition on the grounds that the suspected person is a national of the requested 
state. This bar to extradition was put to an end by 1996 when Article 7 of the 
European Convention on Extradition provided that: 
1. Extradition may not be refused on the ground that the person claimed 
is a national of the requested Member State within the meaning of 
Article 6 of the European Convention on Extradition. 
2. When giving the notification referred to in Article 18 (2), any 
Member State may declare that it will not grant extradition of its 
nationals or will authorize it only under certain specified conditions. 
Article 4(6) of the Framework Decision leaves room for non-execution in the 
case of a custodial sentence or a detention order. However, in principle, there is no 
exception for the surrender of a state’s own nationals, but an exception can be made in 
domestic law under Article 4 of the Framework Decision. Thus, under the Framework 
Decision and national implementing Acts there is some scope for Member States to 
safeguard their nationals from prosecution in another Member State. 
The new extradition system practically prevents a national court of a Member 
State to protest against a crime that is not punishable under its own national 
constitution. Furthermore, it stands against a guarantee safeguarded by the 
constitutions of many Member States: that is the refusal to extradite a state’s own 
citizens. For instance, the Austrian Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Act 
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(1980) exclusively prohibits the extradition of own nationals69. The same prohibition 
also appears in Article 55 of the relatively recent Constitution of the Republic of 
Poland (1997); Article 16 (2) of the German Constitution (1949)70 and Article 11 of 
the Cypriot Constitution (1960)71. One may argue that the Framework Decision was 
drafted without contemplation of the national criminal codes and constitutional 
provisions and therefore its application is impracticable. A counter argument would 
advocate that as EU Citizens enjoy the benefits of working and establishing 
themselves across the Union, they are equally responsible for their acts before the 
national courts of all Member States. Thus, if one accepts that a British citizen has to 
obey the laws of other Member States when abroad, it follows that s/he should be 
extradited back to those Member States once s/he has committed an offence in those 
Member States. 
The first national reaction to the new extradition procedures came from Poland 
in April 27, 2005. Despite the fact that the judicial authorities in Poland had issued 
150 warrants (May 2004 – November 2004) of which thirty were executed, the Polish 
Constitutional Tribunal (Trybunal' Konstytucyjny) decided that surrender of polish 
nationals is incompatible with the Polish Constitution72. The Constitutional Tribunal 
examined a question of law referred by the Gdańsk Regional Court regarding the 
constitutionality and compatibility of Article 607t (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code 
(1997) with Article 55(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. Article 607t 
(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code permits the surrendering of a Polish citizen to the 
authorities of another Member State of the European Union in response to the 
European Arrest Warrant73. On the contrary, Article 55(1) of the Polish Constitution 
makes clear that “the extradition of a Polish citizen shall be forbidden”. The Polish 
Tribunal underlined that it retains the competence to examine the conformity of 
normative acts of the Constitution as well as legal provisions serving to implement 
EU legislation. It highlighted that the Polish Constitution bestows certain rights and 
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obligations to polish citizens. National citizenship, according to the Polish Tribunal, is 
essential for assessing the legal status of an individual and EU Citizenship shall only 
‘complement’ and not ‘replace’ it (Article 17 EC). In the same manner EU 
Citizenship, shall not diminish national constitutional guarantees linked to the 
individual’s fundamental rights. Therefore, according to the Polish Tribunal it was 
necessary to amend the current legislation in force to permit complete implementation 
of the Framework Decision in accordance with the Polish Constitution. 
Almost three months later (July 18, 2005), on similar grounds, the German 
Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht - BVerfG hereafter) not only 
addressed the issue of extradition of own nationals among Member States but also put 
into question the very foundation of a politically united Europe. The BVerfG declared 
the European Arrest Warrant Act void for encroaching upon the freedom from 
extradition74. The European Arrest Warrant Act was intended to implement the 
Framework Decision in German Basic Law. The case concerned, Mamoun 
Darkazanli, a German-Syrian dual national, accused by Spain of providing the terror 
network with logistical and financial support. He was held in custody for extradition 
to Spain under the European Arrest Warrant procedure. Yet on appeal the BVerfG 
ruled that the European Arrest Warrant Act violated the German Constitution that 
explicitly prohibits the extradition of its own citizens and the suspect’s basic rights. 
What is more, at the time the case was at issue, supporting a foreign terrorist 
organisation was not considered a punishable offence under German Basic Law.  
The decision of the BVerfG was based on two points. First it held that the 
European Arrest Warrant Act was contrary to Article 16.2 Basic Law. The first 
sentence of Article 16.2 Basic Law asserts:  “no German may be extradited to a 
foreign country”. According to the BVerfG, the European Arrest Warrant Act 
infringed the protection from extradition offered by the German Constitution to 
German nationals. According to the BVerfG, the German Legislature “had not 
exhausted the margins afforded to it by the Framework Decision in such a way that 
the implementation of the Framework Decision for incorporation into national law 
shows the highest possible consideration in respect of the fundamental right 
concerned”75. Second, the BVerfG held that the European Arrest Warrant Act 
infringes the constitutionally protected freedom against extradition of German citizens 
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disproportionately and contrary to Article 19.4 Basic Law. Article 19.4 Basic Law 
affirms that “should any person’s right be violated by public authority, recourse to the 
court shall be open to him. If no other court has jurisdiction, recourse shall be to the 
ordinary courts.” Thus, Article 19.4 Basic Law guarantees the right of the 
complainant German national to challenge the judicial decision that granted his 
extradition to the courts. According to the BVerfG the European Arrest Warrant Act 
excluded recourse to a court against the grant of extradition to a Member State and 
thus was contrary to the German Basic Law guarantee of recourse to a court.  
The ruling of the BVerfG was not aimed to declare the European Arrest 
Warrant unconstitutional. Instead, similarly to the Polish Tribunal, it declared void the 
German national implementation law (European Arrest Warrant Act). It was made 
clear that the German legislature “could have chosen an implementation that shows a 
higher consideration in respect of the fundamental right concerned without infringing 
the binding objectives of the Framework Decision”76. The BVerfG, for instance, 
supported that the Framework Decision allows the refusal of a Member State’s 
judicial authorities to execute the European Arrest Warrant for offences committed in 
its territory. Hence, the effect of its ruling can be perceived as a short-term blow to 
European anti-terrorism plans and loyal cooperation in the area of police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters. This occurs as the European Arrest Warrant will not 
apply in Germany until a new national implementation law is introduced in the form 
of an Act implementing Article 16.2 Basic Law. This practically means that Germany 
is forced to infringe EU law despite the principle under national and EU law of 
avoiding violations of the Treaty. 
Judge Brob’s dissenting Opinion did not differ from the original decision of 
the German Senate but considered the violation of the principle of subsidiarity as the 
main factor for declaring the European Arrest Warrant Act unconstitutional. Behind 
Judge Brob’s opinion hides the idea that the centralisation of competence at EU level 
would limit the ability of the Member States to guarantee constitutional rights 
currently enjoyed by their citizens. If therefore judicial cooperation throughout the EU 
is a step in the direction of a European Federal State then any concerns related to 
subsidiarity violations are rational. An unprecedented harmonisation of national 
legislation may result in unconstitutional amendments of the national constitutional 
provisions. One may criticize the Union for inflicting a gradual devaluation to the 
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capacity of the nation state to safeguard its own citizens against prosecution by other 
Member States. If this is confirmed as an accurate conclusion, then such a 
development will subsequently imply a seizure of the central meaning and function of 
national citizenship and sovereignty77.  
Yet, the attitude of Germany has been somewhat antiphatic in the recent case 
of Tsokas78. In this case, which took place after the BVerfG declared the European 
Arrest Warrant domestic implementation law unconstitutional, the German Public 
Prosecution issued a European Arrest against two Greek nationals for the offence of 
tax evasion. The execution of the warrants was initially allowed. However, on appeal, 
the Greek Court decided to allow the appeal on the grounds of absence of legal basis 
for extradition. The argument was based on the fact that the domestic European Arrest 
Warrant Act had been declared null and void by the BVerfG. Thus, in the absence of 
national implementation law on the Framework Decision, there was practically no 
legal basis where the German authorities could rely on to put forward an application 
for extradition under the European Arrest Warrant procedure. Moreover, the Greek 
Court clarified that the German approach towards the mode of execution of the 
European Arrest Warrant was contradicting the principle of reciprocity. This decision 
is very important not only in terms of the functioning of the European Arrest Warrant 
but on the way Member States abide to the principles of mutual recognition and 
reciprocity as fundamental constitutional values of Community law. 
Conclusion 
The European Arrest Warrant is an important instrument in the fight against 
organised crime and terrorism. Yet, noticeable obstacles in its application arise due to 
the obvious differences between the Member States’ criminal legal systems in 
assessing the severity of a crime (drug trafficking79, euthanasia / assisted suicide80,  
abortion81 or even plane-spotting inside a military zone82 to name but a few). For 
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instance, Belgium has adopted a critical approach over the Commission’s exclusion of 
abortion and euthanasia from the offence of ‘murder or Grievous Bodily Harm’ in 
(32) of the listed offences83. It seems that European criminal law suffers from a lack 
of any uniform definition of a crime, followed by a lack of mutually accepted 
procedural requirements.  
The most obvious argument is that if under EU law it is possible for a citizen 
to be extradited to another Member State for an act committed and considered lawful 
in her/his own Member State, then national criminal law is stripped of its practical 
effect of safeguarding the well-being of the nation state against threats from overseas. 
Similarly, it is not possible for a citizen of one Member State to be aware that her/his 
actions in that Member State, which s/he may perform in good conscience, may be 
punishable in another. The operation of the European Arrest Warrant is an attempt to 
provide a panacea in the area of extradition procedures but its application produces 
turbulent effects. These arise in cases where there is lack of information in the actual 
warrant or when the offence is not an extraditable one. They also appear on a greater 
scale when certain Member States are confronted with human rights breaches (inter 
alia wrongful imprisonments or miscarriages of justice) and with what their own 
domestic constitutions regard as violations of constitutional guarantees.  
The ECJ has adopted a stringent approach in dealing with national challenges. 
Most recently, in Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v Leden van de Ministerraad, 
Advocate-General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer recommended that the European Court of 
Justice should dismiss a complaint by a Belgian lawyers’ association challenging the 
validity of the Belgian law implementing the European Arrest Warrant. The basis of 
their claim was that the Framework Decision is in breach of Article 34(2)(b) TEU 
(legal status of Framework Decisions) and incompatible with Article 6(2) TEU 
(respect to fundamental rights)84. There are also cases where actions for 
unconstitutionality have been dismissed by domestic courts. On May 3, 2006 for 
instance, the Czech Constitutional Court (Ustavni Soud), dismissed an action 
contesting the European Arrest Warrant implementation law, which according to 
certain senators and MPs was unconstitutional on the ground that it abolished the 
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double criminality rule and authorised the extradition of Czech nationals85. However, 
there are still examples of Member States which have only partially adopted the 
Framework Decision, or have left a greater margin of competence to their judges86. 
Those judges in many cases employ Article 6 of the Framework Decision to prosecute 
cases themselves rather than accepting another country’s warrant87.  
The question of whether the European Arrest Warrant maintains a balance 
between procedural efficiency and civil liberties is still open to discussion. 
Ultimately, the Member States of the European Union need to combine their efforts 
for enhancing mutual cooperation and giving “full faith and credit”88 to each others’ 
‘criminal procedures’ in the fight against terrorism. Indeed, the principle of mutual 
recognition has gone through the danger of being disputed by the lack of genuine 
mutual trust between Member States. The question of how to move forward to a 
unified body of European criminal law could be answered by looking at the example 
of other jurisdictions. For instance, a clause can be inserted in Article 10 TEU or the 
revised version of the EU Constitutional Treaty that would resemble Article IV, 
Section I of the U.S. Constitution where “full faith and credit shall be given in each 
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State”. A 
‘full faith and credit’ clause accompanied by the standards of procedural rights set out 
in the ECHR and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights would 
create the ground framework for adjudicating interstate cases under the EU Arrest 
Warrant. Finally, the Commission needs to rigidly monitor the implementation in 
practice of the EU Arrest Warrant and ensure that any unilateral decisions to restrict 
the rights of EU citizens that may breach human rights are subject to judicial scrutiny 
and proportionality in order to ensure legal certainty. To what ends this effort? 
Practically, plane spotters will be able to spot – twitchers, twitch and true criminals 
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will be restored to face legitimate proceedings in the jurisdiction of their alleged 
offence.  
 
